IN RE GIBSON PRODUCTS:
COMMINGLED PROCEEDS, THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, AND THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
The Uniform Commercial Code was drafted "to permit the
continued expansion of commercial practices" by clarifying and
modernizing the law that governs commercial transactions and
by making the law uniform among the various jurisdictions.'
The underlying premise of the federal Bankruptcy Act2 is "that
it is desirable social policy to allow debt-burdened individuals
and business enterprises the opportunity to make a fresh start."3
In the event of any conflict between the U.C.C. and the Bankruptcy Act, the mandate of the Bankruptcy Act is supreme.4 A
potential conflict arises between the rights of a secured creditor
under the U.C.C. in the event of the debtor's insolvency and the
power of the trustee in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act to
control the priorities of creditors.
Arizona Wholesale Supply Company v. Itule (In re Gibson Products
6
of Arizona) 5 involved such a dispute between a secured creditor
and a trustee in bankruptcy over the bank account of an insol1 U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (1972 version).
2 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

a 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.1, at 1281 (1965).
The Act requires that the bankrupt turn his remaining assets . . .over to a
"trustee" to be sold and applied on the claims of unsecured creditors. In return, the bankrupt gets a "discharge" from most of his debts which constitutes
a defense to any action by a pre-bankruptcy creditor to collect a debt covered
by the discharge. Bankruptcy stops preferential dismemberment of the debtor's
estate, for once bankruptcy occurs unsecured creditors cannot grab remaining
assets of the debtor, even through levy. Bankruptcy also empowers the trustee
to retrieve certain assets that the debtor preferentially transferred on the eve
of bankruptcy. . . . In the end, the bankrupt's unsecured creditors are supposed to receive a prorata dividend from what the trustee is able to salvage.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-1, at 864 (1972) (footnotes
omitted).
4 Congress is empowered to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy by
U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl.4. "[S]tate laws are thus suspended only to the extent of
actual conflict with the system provided by the Bankruptcy Act of Congress." Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918). See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39
(1940).
s 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976), petitionfor cert. filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3544 (U.S. Jan. 12,
1977 (No. 76-1097).
6See note 20 infra.
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vent debtor. The Ninth Circuit determined that it "must referee
a collision between the 'proceeds' provision of the Uniform
Commercial Code . . . and the bankruptcy trustee's power to
avoid preferences under Section 607 of the Bankruptcy Act.' 8 In
the process of refereeing this collision, however, the court misconstrued the meaning of "any cash proceeds" under U.C.C.
section 9-306(4)(d), virtually necessitating the triumph of the
Bankruptcy Act, given the inequitable outcome that would have
resulted otherwise. 9
The creditor, Arizona Wholesale Supply Company
(Wholesale), supplied appliances to the debtor, Gibson Products
of Arizona (Gibson Products), and retained a perfected security
interest in the appliances and any proceeds derived from their
sale. On January 13, 1972, Gibson initiated insolvency proceed-

7 11 U.S.C. § 96(1970).
8 543 F.2d at 653-54. The court was referring to U.C.C. § 9-306(4), A.R.S. § 44-

3127(D). "For convenience, we refer hereafter solely to U.C.C. § 9-306, rather than to
the Arizona statute adopting the U.C.C. We also use the text of the U.C.C. § 9-306
prior to the 1972 amendments because Arizona did not adopt the 1972 amendments
until 1975, effective January 1, 1976, a date long after this litigation began. . . . The
1972 amendments, even if applicable, do not affect the issues in this case." 543 F.2d at
653 n.1 (footnote by the court). Unless otherwise stated, all U.C.C. sections cited in this
Comment are set forth in their pre-1972 form.
I Many scholarly commentaries.provide extensive and conflicting treatments of the
underlying nature of this impending collision. For a list of 16 commentaries on the
subject, see id. n.2; this list is by no means exclusive. See generally, e.g., Ashe, Federal-State
Conflicts of Lan: Bankruptcy Act Vis-a-Vis Uniform Commercial Code, 48 Am. BANKR. L.J. 29
(1974); Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 925 (1974). Two recent commentators illustrate the extent of
the disagreement about the proper solution:
When leading members of the bench and bar have promulgated a statute after
thorough study, the attitude should be that the statutory provisions are valid
and enforceable within the ordinary understanding of their aims and terms. It
is shocking to find every available means employed to show why the provisions
should not be recognized in bankruptcy. The assumption should be that the
Code provisions are enforceable in bankruptcy unless the Bankruptcy Act
clearly forbids them.
Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 CoLum. L. REV. 232, 245-46
(1965) (footnotes omitted). Compare this view with:
I begin by conceding that it was the purpose and intent of the Code draftsmen
to create or to provide protection for a variety of security interests that would
be impervious to bankruptcy. And I have observed with considerable awe both
the skill with which they proceeded and the apparent Frankensteinian urge
which has fired them to create the most nearly perfect monsters possible and
to defend their creations in the courts. But I believe they are vulnerable on
several counts.
Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 Com. L.J. 269, 270 (1970). In the
face of such extensive commentary, this Comment will not attempt to resolve the
broader issue of the priority of rights created under the U.C.C. and under the Bankruptcy Act.
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ings under the Bankruptcy Act. In the ten-day period immediately preceding the institution of these insolvency proceedings,' Gibson Products had cash receipts totalling $19,505.27,
including $10 attributable to the sale of collateral in which Wholesale had a perfected security interest."' Gibson Products deposited the entire amount in its bank account, where it was commingled with existing funds. At the time of insolvency, Gibson
Products owed Wholesale $28,800.12
Wholesale claimed a right to the entire $19,505.27, because
it had a perfected security interest in these "proceeds" under
section 9-306(4) of the Uniform Commercial Code:
(4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a secured party with a
perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected
security interest
(d) in all cash and bank accounts of the debtor if
other cash proceeds have been commingled or deposited in a bank account, but the perfected security interest under this paragraph (d) is
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the
amount of any cash proceeds received by the debtor
within ten days before the institution of the insolvency
proceedings and commingled or deposited in a bank
account prior to the insolvency proceedings ....1
Wholesale showed that $10 in "other cash proceeds" had been
commingled in the bank account, and therefore claimed that all
of the $19,505.27 was within the terms of subsection (ii). The
bankruptcy judge awarded the entire amount to Wholesale, and
14
the district court affirmed the bankruptcy judge's order.
The Ninth Circuit similarly interpreted "proceeds" in section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) as referring to proceeds from the sale of any
collateral and not just from the collateral of the particular secured creditor. The court then held that section 9-306(4)(d) enti-

"' This 10-day period is significant because U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii) includes such a
time limitation.
11 543 F.2d at 654.
,21d. at 655.
13 U.C.C. § 9-306(4).
14 543 F.2d at 654.
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tied Wholesale to all the cash receipts received and deposited in
this commingled account within the ten days prior to bankruptcy
and not just the amount attributable to the sale of Wholesale's
collateral. 1 5 Consequently, the trustee in bankruptcy claimed that
Wholesale's right to these proceeds under section 9-306(4)(d)
was a transfer of property within four months before the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings and was therefore a "preference" that he is empowered to avoid under section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act.1 6 Having determined that Wholesale had a
right to the commingled proceeds, the court then had to determine the point at which the transfer occurred. The court noted
that the transfer could not have occurred earlier than ten days
before the institution of bankruptcy proceedings because the
U.C.C. section giving Wholesale its interest related to this tenday period; the court therefore held that the transfer was a
voidable preference.1 7 The court, however, stated that the creditor would be able to defeat the trustee's assertion of a preference to the extent that the creditor was able to identify proceeds
from the sale of his collateral by tracing their path into the
1 8
commingled funds.
This Comment will examine the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of section 9-306(4)(d) of the U.C.C., demonstrating that the
court misunderstood the underlying premise of the provision
and consequently misconstrued it. This Comment will also illustrate how the court's holding effectively frustrates the purpose
of section 9-306(4)(d) by reviving the tracing of proceeds, a process that this provision was designed to eliminate. Finally, this
Comment will analyze the court's resolution of the conflict between the creditor's right under the U.C.C. and the trustee's
power under the Bankruptcy Act, demonstrating that although
the court's conclusion as to the voidability issue can be supported, its incorrect construction of section 9-306(4)(d) prevented a fair evaluation of the competing interests.
,5Id. at 656.
11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970). This section provides:
A preference is a transfer ... of any of the property of a debtor to or for
the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or
suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing
by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title, the
effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater
percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
(emphasis supplied).
'7 543 F.2d at 657.
18Id.
16
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INTERPRETATION OF THE U.C.C.

A. The Extent of a Creditor'sSecurity Interest in the Event
of Insolvency Proceedings Under Section 9-306(4)
The major issue in Gibson Products is the extent of a
creditor's security interest in a bank account of the debtor that
contains commingled proceeds at the time of bankruptcy. Section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) limits the creditor to an "amount not greater
than the amount of any cash proceeds received by the debtor"
within ten days before insolvency proceedings are instituted. 19
The crucial issue is whether "any cash proceeds" refers to all of
the money that Gibson Products received from sales within ten
days before insolvency proceedings, or simply the cash received
from the sale of the collateral of the particular creditor during
those ten days.
Analysis of this problem must begin by looking at the overall
thrust of section 9-306. Section 9-306 of the U.C.C. deals with
the rights of a secured party2 0 to "proceeds" from the disposition
of "collateral." "Collateral" is defined as "the property subject to
a security interest."' 21 A "security interest" is defined as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or
performance of an obligation. '"22 Section 9-306(1) defines "proceeds" as follows: "'Proceeds' includes whatever is received when
collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise
disposed of....-23 Thus, section 9-306 is concerned with the
continuing rights of the creditor in his collateral and any subsequent proceeds derived from it.Consequently, the implication of
these definitions is that "proceeds" refers only to receipts of the
debtor upon the disposition of the secured creditor's collateral.
Given this definition of "proceeds," the limitation in section
9-306(4)(d)(ii) to "an amount not greater than the amount of any
cash proceeds ' 24 should therefore entitle Wholesale to only $10
derived from the sale of its collateral.
Section 9-306(4) defines the extent of a secured party's security interest in proceeds in the event of the institution of insolvency proceedings. Under these circumstances, the secured
19 U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii) (emphasis supplied).
20 U.C.C. § 9-105(m) defines a secured party as "a lender, seller or other person in
whose favor there is a security interest, including a person to whom accounts, contract
rights, or chattel paper have been sold."
21U.C.C. § 9-105(c).
22 U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
23 U.C.C. § 9-306(1).
24 U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(ii) (emphasis supplied).
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creditor has a perfected security interest in all of the easily identifiable proceeds: "identifiable non-cash proceeds, ' 2 5 "identifiable
cash proceeds in the form of money which is not commingled with other money or deposited in a bank account prior to
the insolvency proceedings," 2 6 and "identifiable cash proceeds in
the form of checks and the like which are not deposited in a
bank account prior to the insolvency proceedings. '27 Additionally, section 9-306(4)(d) gives the creditor a secured interest in
part or all of debtor's commingled funds. The commingling of
28
funds often increases the difficulty of identifying proceeds.
Traditionally, tracing techniques such as the lowest intermediate
balance rule 2 9 were used to identify proceeds that had been
commingled with other funds over a long period of time. The
U.C.C. draftsmen decided to change this procedure by limiting
the amount recoverable by the creditor to either the amount
25 U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(a). It is important to recognize "that a bank account is not a

cash proceed; it is a debt owed by the bank to the depositor. Thus a secured creditor
has a right to a segregated account (one containing only his proceeds) because of
9-306(4)(a)." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 24-6, at 886 (emphasis in original);
see G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 45.9, at 1338. The 1972 amendments to U.S.C. § 9306(4)(a) make this point explicit by adding the phrase "and in separate deposit accounts containing only proceeds." U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(a) (1972 version).
26 U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(b).
27 U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(c). This subsection "does not use the 'commingled with other
money' phrase, presumably because the checks are not regarded as fungible." G.
GILMORE, supra note 3, § 45.9, at 1338.
21 Commingled accounts will usually be in a constant state of flux as funds from
various sources are deposited and withdrawn over a period of time; as a result, tedious
tracing techniques must be used to identify the creditor's proceeds. Although funds are
commingled, however, it is not necessarily difficult to identify the proceeds from a
creditor's collateral. For example, if a debtor deposits $100 of proceeds into a bank
account with $100 of nonproceeds and goes bankrupt without making any additional
deposits or withdrawals, the identification of the $100 of proceeds will be very simple.
29This general rule for tracing proceeds commingled with other funds presumes
that any withdrawals from the fund are made from money other than that attributable
to the creditor's collateral, as long as other funds are in the account. When all the
nonproceeds have been dissipated, however, and the debtor begins to expend proceeds,
the creditor is not entitled to any nonproceeds that are subsequently deposited in the
account as compensation for the proceeds that have been expended. For example, in
the following situation, $500 would be available under tracing:
Transaction
Amount
Balance
Opening balance
$200
Creditor proceeds deposited
$700
$900
Withdrawal
$400
$500
Deposit of other funds
$300
$800
Even though $800 remains in the account, the creditor is not entitled to $700, because
the lowest intermediate balance was $500-the most possibly attributable to the $700
received from the sale of creditor's collateral. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 F.2d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 1974); Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp. v. Farmers B~ank, 358 F. Supp. 317, 325-27 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Associates Discount
Corp. v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 111 N.J. Super. 353, 268 A.2d 330 (1970).
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attributable to the sale of his collateral only during the ten days
prior to insolvency proceedings, or, if smaller, the balance of
the account. The essential distinction between these methods
of determining the creditor's security interest is that section
9-306(4)(d) allows the creditor to enforce an equitable lien upon
nonproceeds to the extent that any of the proceeds attributable
to the sale of his collateral were expended by the debtor during
the ten days prior to the institution of bankruptcy proceedings;
the creditor, however, forfeits the right to an equitable lien on
any proceeds from his collateral that were received more than
ten days prior to bankruptcy and are commingled with other
funds. 3" "The intent was to eliminate the expense and nuisance
of tracing when funds are commingled .. .
The Seventh Circuit accepted this analysis in Fitzpatrick v.
Philco Finance Corp. 2 In Fitzpatrick, the secured creditor had received $44,766.84 from the bankrupt's bank account within the
ten days prior to insolvency, although only $4,513.44 was attributable to the sale of the creditor's collateral during those ten
days. 33 The trustee in bankruptcy did not contest the amount
attributable to the creditor's collateral sold during the last ten
days; rather, he sought only the return of the $40,253.40 difference as a voidable preference under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. 3 4 The court explicitly rejected the creditor's conten30 Thus, whether or not a creditor:.is better off under the methods prescribed by
tracing or § 9-306(4)(d) will largely idkend upon the amount of proceeds that the
creditor allows the debtor to retain an idnmmingle for more than 10 days. Professor
Gilmore suggests that the secured creditor'will usually realize less under § 9-306(4)(d):
In the great run of cases, whatever is left in the debtor's bank account on
bankruptcy day will represent deposits of proceeds of collateral made during
the several weeks preceding bankruptcy. On pre-Code theories of tracing, the
secured party in many cases might be able to establish his claim to the entire
balance. Paragraph (4)(d) restricts his claim to whatever may haVe been' re-.
ceived during the last 10 days . . . . To protect himself the secured party will.-,
have to require periodic accounting; if he does not pick up the proceeds at
10-day intervals, he will lose them irretrievably in the one contingency where.
he will ever need them-the institution of insolvency proceedings.
G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 45.9, at 1340.
11 543 F.2d at 655.

32 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974).
33
1d. at 1290.
34 The court expressed surprise that the trustee did not challenge the entire
amount paid to the creditor.
In view of the extensive speculation about the potential conflict between section 9-306(4)(d) and the Bankruptcy Act, it is somewhat surprising that the
trustee did not challenge Philco's right to the $4,513.44 paid froin commingled
funds ....
Since the trustee did not raise this intriguing issue here or below,
we cannot consider it.
Id. at 1292 n.4.
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tion that the phrase "any cash proceeds" in section 9-306(4)(d)(ii)
refers to all receipts deposited in the bank account from the sale
of any collateral rather than to receipts solely from the sale of
the creditor's collateral. After referring to the definition of proceeds in section 9-306(1), the court concluded:
Such an interpretation ignores the definition of "proceeds" and perverts the intent of the legislature in
adopting section 9-306. . . . The grant of a security
interest in commingled funds under section 9-306(4)(d)
is not an expansion of the pre-Code right of a secured
creditor to trace proceeds from the disposition of secured collateral into such funds; instead, it is a substitution for and a limitation upon that right. . .. To
implement the statutory scheme, "any cash proceeds"
in subsection (ii) must mean cash proceeds from the
sale of collateral in which the creditor had a security
35
interest.
The court held that the overage of $40,253.40 was a voidable
preference and ordered that it be returned to the trustee.36
In Gibson Products, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the
Fitzpatrick interpretation of "any cash proceeds. 3 7 Gibson Products
found that section 9-306(4) "divides 'proceeds' into two categories, 'identifiable' and 'commingled', i.e., nonidentifiable proceeds," and concluded that section 9-306(4)(d) was concerned
only with nonidentifiable cash proceeds.3 8 Consequently, the
court rejected the contention that the general definition of "proceeds" in section 9-306(1) necessarily should be "transplanted
into Section 9-306(4)."13 Furthermore, the court apparently misinterpreted Fitzpatrick as holding that section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) "limited the secured creditor's interest to those proceeds in the bank
account traceable to the sale of the creditor's collateral.' 4 The
35

Id.at 1291-92 (footnotes & citations omitted).
1d. at 1292. The court had to invoke § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act only because
the creditor already had received the overage and the trustee was seeking its return. If
the creditor had not yet received this overage and had brought suit to claim it, the case
could have been settled simply by properly interpreting § 9-306(4)(d) of the U.C.C.,
without any reference to the Bankruptcy Act.
37543 F.2d at 656.
38
Id.The court supported this conclusion by comparing §§ 9-306(4)(a), (b), and (c)
with § 9-306(4)(d).
36

39

Id.

4"Id. (emphasis supplied). The Fitzpatrick Court did not limit the secured creditor to
those proceeds identifiable by tracing techniques; rather, Fitzpatrick said that § 9-
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Ninth Circuit subsequently rejected the Fitzpatrick interpretation of "any cash proceeds" because it concluded that the right to
identifiable proceeds was already granted in section 9-306(4)(b)
and that section 9-306(4)(d) was only concerned with nonidentifiable (and therefore "nontraceable")proceeds.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis is flawed in several respects.
The court erroneously interpreted section 9-306(4) as creating
a strict dichotomy between "identifiable" and "commingled"
proceeds; 41 the statute actually draws a different distinction
-between nonfungible proceeds plus noncommingled fungible
proceeds, and commingled fungible proceeds. 42 The court compounded this error by equating "nonidentifiable" proceeds with
"commingled" proceeds and concluding that section 9-306(4)(d)

dealt only with nonidentifiable proceeds. 43 The Ninth Circuit
found that "[u]nder the Code scheme, the secured creditor ...
has a perfected security interest under subsection (d) when he
cannot identfy his proceeds in the commingled fund. '44 Consequently, the Gibson Products court rejected the Fitzpatrick con-

clusion that "any cash proceeds" referred only to proceeds from
306(4)(d) gave the secured creditor a right to any commingled funds, but limited such
funds to an amount equal to the amount received from the sale of his collateral received in the 10 days prior to insolvency. 491 F.2d at 1291-92. Thus, if Gibson Products
used "traceable" to connote "identifiable by tracing techniques," then the Ninth Circuit
misinterpreted the Fitzpatrick analysis; but if Gibson Products used "traceable" loosely and
really meant "attributable to the sale of the creditor's collateral," then the Ninth Circuit
did not misinterpret the language of Fitzpatrick. Gibson Products asserted that it reached
a result similar to Fitzpatrick. 543 F.2d at 656. Because the court ultimately determined
that tracing survives under § 9-306(4)(d), however, the Ninth Circuit probably did misinterpret the Fitzpatrickanalysis.
41 These two groups are not mutually exclusive because proceeds do not become
"nonidentifiable" simply by being "commingled" with nonproceeds. See note 28 supra.
42
See notes 25-28 supra & accompanying text.
'3543 F.2d at 656. See notes 28 & 41 supra.
44Id. at 656 (emphasis supplied). The court supported this conclusion by citing the
draftsmen's comment on § 9-306(4)(d):
The change in existing law made by this Section relates to non-identifible cash
proceeds; the secured party has, under conditions stated in subsection (4)(d), a
security interest in the debtor's cash and bank accounts equal to the amount of
cash proceeds received and commingled or deposited within the 10 days before
insolvency proceedings were instituted . . . without regard to whether or not
the funds are identifiable as cash proceeds of the collateral.
Section 9-306, Draftsmen's Comment, U.C.C. Rep. Serv., Current Materials, 9306, at
60 (1968). The court, however, apparently misunderstood this language. Gibson Products
interpreted this passage to mean that § 9-306(4)(d) deals exclusively with nonidentifiable
proceeds, and that a creditor has a secured interest in any proceeds, regardless of the
collateral that produced them. This passage, however, was probably meant to illustrate
that § 9-306(4)(d) was designed to permit a creditor to enforce an equitable lien upon
nonproceeds to the extent that any of his proceeds collected during the 10 days prior to
bankruptcy had been expended by the debtor. See note 30 supra.
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the creditor's collateral. 45 Such a broad interpretation of nonidentifiable proceeds necessarily engendered the inequitable result where one creditor could secure a claim to the entire commingled fund.
The court failed to be consistent within its own analytical
framework when it dealt with the problem of statutory construction. Discussing the rights of a secured creditor under section
9-306(4)(d) to commingled funds that are not proceeds from the
creditor's collateral, the court stated: "His interest in these nonproceeds arises upon the occurrence of two events: (1) insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, and (2)
commingling of some of the proceeds from collateral with the
debtor's cash on hand or with other deposits in his debtor's bank
account. '4 6 Thus, in interpreting the requirement of section
9-306(4)(d) that "other cash proceeds" be commingled, the court
read proceeds as meaning receipts from the sale of the creditor's
collateral. 47 The court undoubtedly recognized that any other
reading (i.e., that "proceeds" here meant all of the debtor's cash
receipts) would make the section nonsensical by giving every
secured creditor a perfected security interest in any commingled
cash receipts of the debtor upon the debtor's insolvency. Yet the
court's interpretation of "other cash proceeds" was inconsistent
with its determination that section 9-306(4)(d) was concerned
only with "nonidentifiable" proceeds. Furthermore, it is highly
unlikely that the draftsmen of the Code would change the definition of "proceeds" in section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) without any warning
or reason after defining the term in section 9-306(1) and consistently adhering to that definition in the rest of section 9-306,
including section 9-306(4)(d).
The court's interpretation is also troublesome in light of the
purpose of section 9-306(4)(d). As the Ninth Circuit pointed out
in Gibson Products:
The draftsmen's intent was not to deliver a security
bonanza to any secured creditor .... The intent was to
45 543 F.2d at 656. It is unclear whether the Ninth Circuit correctly interpreted the
Fitzpatrick analysis. See note 40 supra. Even if the court in Gibson Products understood the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning, it probably would have rejected the Fitzpatrick court's interpretation of "any cash proceeds" in any event because of its own determination that
§ 9-306(4)(d) is concerned only with nonidentifiable proceeds. See text accompanying

note 43 supra.
46

Id. (emphasis supplied).

47The court later repeated this interpretation, stating that the secured creditor

must "show that some of his proceeds were among those in the commingled fund." Id.
at 656 (emphasis supplied).
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eliminate the expense and nuisance of tracing when
funds are commingled and to limit the grasp of secured
creditors to the amount received during the last ten days
before insolvency proceedings, which, the draftsmen assumed, would usually be less than the same creditor
could trace if he had a grip on the entire balance over
an unlimited time.4 8
Because the draftsmen's intent was to approximate what the
creditor was entitled to under tracing procedures, the most logical solution was to limit his recovery to the "amount received"
attributable to his own collateral.
Although the amount of proceeds attributable to the
creditor's collateral received in the last ten days before bankruptcy and the amount that could be identified by traditional
tracing techniques may not always be close, 49 they are at least
plausible substitutes. In contrast, no logical connection exists between all the receipts of a debtor and the amount to which the
secured creditor would be entitled by tracing his proceeds. Thus,
the court's conclusion that Wholesale was entitled to $19,505.27
under section 9-306(4)(d) instead of the $10 attributable to the
sale of its collateral was both unsupportable as a matter of statutory construction and inconsistent with the purpose of the
statute.
B. Does Tracing Survive Section 9-306(4)?
In Gibson Products, the court concluded that "[t]o the extent
that a creditor is able to identify his proceeds to trace their path
into the commingled funds, he will be able to defeat pro tanto the
trustee's assertion of a preference."5 " Under the court's reasoning, even if the trustee in bankruptcy invalidates the secured
creditor's claim under section 9-306(4)(d), the creditor can fall
back on the right to trace as an alternative method of recovery. 51
8
' Id. at 655-56 (emphasis supplied); see G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 45.9, at
1337-40.
49
See note 30 supra.
51 543 F.2d at 657.
51The court remarked:
The creditor's security interest in the whole account under Section 9-306(4) is
primafacie valid, except as to the trustee, and, as to him, the creditor's security
interest is presumptively preferential. The creditor can rebut the presumption
by appropriately tracing his proceeds. We think that it is fair to place the burden on the creditor to identify his own proceeds ....
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Some authority supports the court's conclusion; 52 but the weight
of authority tends to indicate that the right to trace does not
survive under section 9-306(4)(d), which is meant to create an
exclusive right. 53 Professor Gilmore writes:
The idea evidently is that the right to trace does not survive
unless the debtor has been required to segregate the
cash proceeds from his other cash assets. If he is allowed to deposit the money, checks and so on in his
general checking account along with other deposits, the
secured party, in the event insolvency proceedings are
instituted, cannot claim anything in the checking account by
showing, through conventional tracing techniques, that some
or all of the balance represents deposits
or proceeds in
54
which he had a perfected interest.
The Ninth Circuit's holding that tracing is an alternative method
of recovery in the event of insolvency is thus contradicted by
academic opinion; although case law on the right to trace after
insolvency is sparse, 55 it was discussed in Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc. 5 6 The court in Lepley
concluded that the U.C.C. "gives a secured party the right to a
debtor's cash proceeds received in the ten-day period in lieu of the
right to trace which a secured party had prior to enactment of the
" "If a court should decide that 9-306(4)(d) is invalid in bankruptcy, it would not
necessarily follow that the trustee would prevail. We believe that the secured creditor
would be entitled to revive his pre-Code common law rights to identifiable proceeds
and prevail as to those." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 24-6, at 888.
"' G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 45.9, at 1338; see Finan, The Secured Party and His
Nemesis, the Trustee in Bankruptcy: After-Acquired Property, Unidentified Proceeds, and Selected
Preference Problems, 3 AKRON L. REV. 93, 140-41 (1970); Hawldand, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC Part II: Proceeds, 77 Com. L.J. 12, 19 (1972).
G. GILMORE, supra note 3, § 45.9, at 1338 (emphasis supplied).
G'
5Some courts have found an implied right to trace in other parts of § 9-306 that
do not involve insolvency proceedings. For example, in Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v.
Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317, 323-24 (E.D. Mo. 1973), the court found a continuing
right to trace proceeds that had been commingled with other funds implicit in §
9-306(2) of the U.C.C. because of its use of the word "identifiable." Accord, Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. First NaCl Bank, 504 F.2d 998, 1002 (7th Cir. 1974);
Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Flowers Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 26 N.C. App. 690, 217 S.E.2d
108 (1975). Subsections 9-306(4)(a), (b), and (c) refer to "identifiable" proceeds, but
they cannot be read to create an implied right to trace commingled funds that would
correspond to the right found in § 9-306(2) because they are expressly concerned with
proceeds that have not been commingled. Although § 9-306(4)(d) is concerned with
commingled funds, it does not address itself to "identifiable" cash proceeds. Thus, no
language in § 9-306(4)(d) can be interpreted to imply a right to trace in addition to the
right of recovery that it explicitly prescribes. Without such helpful language, the
rationale of Universal Cl. T. is inapposite.
5 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 395 (Ct. of C.P. 1958).
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code. '57 Although Lepley involved an interpretation of an earlier
version of section 9-306, that version is essentially identical to the
one that was before the court in Gibson Products.58 Lepley indicated that tracing was inconsistent with the purposes of the insolvency provisions of section 9-306.39
In addition to such academic and judicial rejection of the
position taken in Gibson Products, the 1972 amendments to the
U.C.C. provide an even more compelling argument for its rejection. Section 9-306(4) was changed to read: "(4) In the event of
insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a
.1o
perfected security interest only in the following proceeds ....
The official reasons for this change state that "[t]he revised subsection (4) . . . makes clear that the claim to cash allowed '6in1
insolvency is exclusive of any other claim based on tracing.
After the 1972 amendments, therefore, there is little doubt that
the common law right to trace does not survive under section
9-306(4)(d). Moreover, if the change "makes clear" that 9-306(4)
is exclusive, this statement then implies that exclusivity was intended in the pre-1972 version before the court in Gibson
Products. The available evidence, therefore, strongly suggests
that the Ninth Circuit erred in accepting tracing as an alternative
means of recovery under section 9-306(4)(d).
Given this error, the court's characterization of the creditor's
rights under section 9-306(4)(d) is also inapt. The court implicitly relied on the right to trace to achieve equity in the long
run by providing the creditor whose U.C.C. right had been
voided an alternative means of obtaining the proceeds attributable to his collateral. If the right to trace does not survive, then
the right created by section 9-306(4)(d) is the creditor's exclusive
5 Id. at 405 (emphasis supplied).

58 The version of § 9-306 before the court in Lepley read:
(2) In insolvency proceedings a secured party with a perfected security
interest has a right to the cash and bank accounts of the debtor equal to the
amount of cash proceeds received by the debtor within ten days before the
institution of such proceedings less the amount of such proceeds received by
the debtor and paid over to the secured party during the ten day period, but
no other right to or lien on cash proceeds not subjected to his control before
insolvency proceedings are instituted.
Id. at 400. The old version thus reflects the same intent to specify and limit the rights
of a secured creditor upon the debtor's insolvency.
'9 The court stated: "This subsection fixes the status of such cash and provides a
simple rule to avoid controversy and as to cash there is no necessity for tracing and no
advantage to tracing." Id. at 401.
60 U.C.C. § 9-306(4) (1972 version).
61U.C.C. § 9-306, Reasons for 1972 Change (emphasis supplied).
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means of retrieving the proceeds of his collateral. The court
stated that this right is prima facie valid except as to the trustee
in bankruptcy; 62 but this reading effectively undermines the
right altogether because the creditor must always confront the
trustee in these circumstances. The section 9-306(4)(d) right only
arises in the event of insolvency; the trustee will always be able to
avoid the preference because under the court's analysis, the right
only arises within the ten days prior to insolvency, automatically
falling within the four-month statutory period specified by the
Bankruptcy Act. 63 This line of reasoning would make the
creditor's right meaningless and thereby undermine an express
purpose of the U.C.C.
C. Impact of the Court's Interpretation of
Section 9-306(4)(d) of the U.C.C.
In sum, the Ninth Circuit arrived at two interpretations of
section 9-306(4)(d) in Gibson Products that have important ramifications for the preference issue: (1) if some of the proceeds
attributable to the sale of the creditor's collateral are commingled, the creditor is then entitled to any commingled proceeds
received by the debtor within ten days of the institution of bankruptcy proceedings, although these proceeds may exceed the
amount that is properly attributable to the sale of the creditor's
collateral in the ten-day period; and (2) the creditor's right to
trace survives under section 9-306(4)(d) as an alternative method
of recovery if the trustee in bankruptcy defeats the creditor's
claim by invoking section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. The court
repeatedly emphasized that the Code draftsmen intended that
section 9-306(4)(d) would usually provide the secured creditor
with less than he was entitled to receive by tracing. 64 Yet Judge
Hufstedler's questionable interpretation of "any cash proceeds"
in 9-306(4)(d)(ii) resulted in a windfall to the secured creditor;
Wholesale was entitled to $19,505.27 even though it had only
shown that $10 was attributable to the sale of its collateral. This
interpretation placed the secured creditor in an unfairly advantageous position in relation to the general creditors because,
62543 F.2d at 657.
63

Id.
6 See note 48 supra. Professor Gilmore, quoted extensively for this proposition in

Gibson Products, stated that "in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred (the estimate is conservative), what will be in the debtor's account on the date of insolvency, in any case
where a secured party has a § 9-306(4)(d) claim, will have come from deposits of proceeds to a much greater extent than the carefully limited amount of the claim." G.
GILMORE, supra note 3, § 45.9, at 1339.

1977]

IN RE GIBSON PRODUCTS

under the court's reading of section 9-306(4)(d)(ii), the secured
creditor would recover an amount that greatly exceeded the
amount attributable to the sale of its collateral and would
thereby foreclose other creditors from recovering. The apparent
inequity of this result distressed the court, 65 and in effect mandated an invalidation of the recovery as a voidable preference
under the Bankruptcy Act. Thus, the court's incorrect interpretation of "any cash proceeds" made the creditor's right that
arises by virtue of the U.C.C. seem unjust and thus warranted an
avoidance under the Bankruptcy Act.66
In addition to the equity problems that arise when one
judgment creditor is permitted to recover the entire amount of
the proceeds to the detriment of all other secured creditors, the
Gibson Products interpretation of "proceeds" would mean that the
first creditor who could get to the courts and win a judgment
under section 9-306(4)(d) would take a debtor's major assets.
This resultant "race to the courts" is contrary to the apparent
policy of this provision: to limit the recovery of each creditor to
an amount that is properly attributable to the sale of his
collateral.
The court's erroneous observation that tracing rights still
exist under section 9-306(4)(d) buttressed its holding that
Wholesale's right to the commingled funds was a voidable preference under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. If tracing does
not survive, and the right under section 9-306(4)(d) is considered
a voidable preference, the secured creditor would have no access
to commingled funds upon the insolvency of the debtor. If tracing does survive, however, the trustee will usually be uable to
avoid a preference in favor of a secured creditor up to the
amount of traceable proceeds because the transfer will relate
back to the initial financing statement. 6 7 The court's determination that tracing existed as an alternative method of recovery
mitigated the apparent harshness of voidability, facilitating the
68
conclusion that the creditor's claim was a voidable preference.
6'5
"On [the assumption of the draftsmen], awarding a perfected security interest to
the secured creditor, good for a short time on the entire balance, gives the secured
creditor no windfall to the detriment of general creditors. On our facts, the contrary is
true." 543 F.2d at 656.
66 "The provisions collide under circumstances that place the creditor, asserting a
perfected security interest in the debtor's bank account, in the dimmest equitable light:
If the creditor prevails, it receives $19,505.27 from the debtor's account on proof that
the debtor, within ten days of the insolvency, deposited $10 in the account from the
sale of [creditor's collateral]." Id. at 654.
67 See text accompanying note 87 infra.
68 "The creditor can rebut the presumption [of a preference] by appropriately trac-
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Thus, both of the Ninth Circuit's interpretations of section
9-306(4)(d) seemingly justified its determination that the right
created by that provision was voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy as a preference.
II.

9-306(4)(d) CREATE A "VOIDABLE PREFERENCE"
SECTION 60 OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT?

DOES SECTION
UNDER

A. The Meaning of "Transfer" in Section 60
Section 60(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act states that one of the
requirements of a preference is "a transfer ... made or suffered
by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before
the filing by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding
under this title."' 69 In Gibson Products, the court had to decide
whether the creditor's right to proceeds granted by section
7
9-306(4) came within the four-month test of section 60(a)(1) 11
71
and was thus voidable as a preference.
The Ninth Circuit previously addressed the problem of defining when a transfer occurs under section 60 in DuBay v.
Williams.72 In DuBay, a creditor made a $55,000 loan to a newspaper that was secured by the accounts receivable of the newspaper. Both the closing of the security agreement and the filing
of a financing statement for the transaction occurred more than
four months before a bankruptcy petition was filed against the
debtor. 73 A "transfer" problem arose because the creditor was
given a floating lien on both the existing accounts receivable of
the debtor as well as on any accounts receivable that might come
ing his proceeds. We think that it is fair to place the burden on the creditor to identify
[trace] his own proceeds and thus to defeat, in whole or in part, the trustee's claim of
preference." 543 F.2d at 657.
69 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970).
70 U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment 2(b) suggests that the draftsmen believed that the
rights granted in bankruptcy under the U.C.C. would not conflict with the four-month
provision of § 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act:
Subsections (2) and (3) make clear that the four-month period for calculating a voidable preference in bankruptcy begins with the date of the secured
party's obtaining the security interest in the original collateral and not with the
date of his obtaining control of the proceeds. The interest in the proceeds
"continues" as a perfected interest if the original interest was perfected.
Sections 9-306(2) and (3) define the procedure that allows a creditor to obtain a perfected security interest in the original collateral in a manner similar to the definition of
"transfer" under the Bankruptcy Act that was articulated in DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d
1277 (9th Cir. 1969). See text accompanying notes 72-78 infra.
71 This was the question that Fitzpatrick did not reach. See note 34 supra.
72417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
73 The financing statement was filed four days after the parties entered into the
security agreement. See id. at 1285-86.
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into existence in the future.7 4 When the newspaper became insolvent, its accounts receivable included several accounts that
had come into existence within the four months prior to bankruptcy. The Ninth Circuit had to decide whether the security
interest in these "after-acquired" accounts was a voidable preference because the "transfer" occurred at the time that the accounts came into existence, or whether the creditor's claim to all
the accounts was protected against the trustee because the
"transfer" of these accounts occurred at some time prior to the
commencement of the statutory four-month period.
The DuBay court looked to the Bankruptcy Act to define
when a transfer occurs:
[A] transfer of property other than real property shall
be deemed to have been made or suffered at the time
when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien
upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable
proceedings on a simple contract could become su75
perior to the rights of the transferee.
The court, interpreting the "so far perfected" language, concluded that this section did not require full perfection of the
security interest to constitute a transfer. " 'Transfer' for the purpose of section 60a(2) is thus equated with the act by which
priority over later creditors is achieved and not with the event
which attaches the security interest to a specific account. '76 The
court then looked to state law to determine the point at which
the creditor's "claim to the future accounts was sufficiently asserted to prevent a subsequent lien creditor from achieving
77
priority over it in those accounts.1
In DuBay, Judge Hufstedler concluded that the transfer occurred when the financing statement was filed because this was
the point at which no subsequent lienholder could achieve a
superior interest. 78 The secured creditor then had an instantaneous security interest in any account receivable that came into
existence after the filing of the financing statement. No judg7

4 Id.

75 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1970) (emphasis supplied), quoted in DuBay v. Williams, 417
F.2d 1277, 1287 (9th Cir. 1976).
76417 F.2d at 1287.
77
Id. at 1287-88.
78Id. at 1288. Section 60(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Act states: "The provisions of
paragraph (2) [definition of transfer] . . . shall apply whether or not there are or were
creditors who might have obtained such liens ...." 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(3) (1970). Thus,
no such creditors need actually exist to apply the DuBay test.
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ment creditor could possibly acquire a lien before this instantaneous interest became effective.7 9 The court asserted that this
conclusion harmonized with the purposes of section 60:
(1) to prevent an insistent creditor from harvesting
more than his fair share of the insolvent's assets by obtaining transfers from the debtor on the eve of bankruptcy, and (2) to discourage extension of credit to
debtors under circumstances which concealed from
general creditors the precarious financial condition of
8
the debtor. 11
Judge Hufstedler ultimately favored this interpretation of
"transfer" because it improves the flow of credit and recognizes
the attempt of the U.C.C. to make security transactions conform
to the ' legitimate
needs of commerce rather than to "conceptual
nicety. 'St
B.

The Ninth Circuit'sApplication of Section 60 and the
DuBay Test in Gibson Products
The "sufficient perfection theory"8 2 or "dual perfection
theory '83 discussed in DuBay has found a substantial following in
other jurisdictions.8 4 In addition, the Ninth Circuit has subse" In Grain Merchants, Inc. v. Union Bank & Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969), cited in DuBay, the court stated:
Thus we are presented with a situation where as soon as an account receivable
comes into existence and is sought to be attached by a lien creditor, it has
already become subject to a perfected security interest .... The very occurrence which gives rise to the full perfection of the security interest prevents the
subsequent lien creditor from obtaining a priority as to the property.
Id.at 213 (footnote omitted).
80417 F.2d at 1288. The court reasoned:
[The creditor's] floating lien on accounts receivable was easily ascertainable by
any creditor who cared to look at the financing statement. After the financing
statement was filed, no creditor could reasonably have been misled into believing that [the creditor's] receivables would provide assets to which he could look
to satisfy debts incurred for subsequent extensions of credit.
Id.at 1289.
81
See id.
82 See generally Note, The Sufficient Perfection Theory-The Floating Lien Upheld in
Bankruptcy, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 705 (1969).
83 See generally Note, Section 60 Voidable Preference and the UCC: A Hypothetical, 9 GA.
L. REV. 685, 687-89 (1975).
84 See e.g., Mills Morris Co. v. Scanlon (In re King-Porter Co.), 446 F.2d 722 (5th
Cir. 1971); Grain Merchants, Inc. v. Union Bank & Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969); Owen v. McKesson & Robbins Drug Co., 349 F. Supp.
1327 (N.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd mem., 486 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973); Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Coos Fidelity Corp., 266 Ore. 1, 511 P.2d 345 (1973).
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quently reaffirmed its approval of DuBay. 85 In Gibson Products,
after determining that the U.C.C. entitled the secured creditor
to the entire amount of the commingled funds up to the value of
its collateral, the court had to ascertain when the "transfer" occurred for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. The court relied on
its earlier position in DuBay to stress that state law determines
when subsequent equitable or legal lienholders can no longer
obtain a position superior to
the secured creditor in the battle
86
over commingled proceeds.

The court drew a distinction between the interests in proceeds and in nonproceeds for purposes of "relating back" to the
initial transaction. Wholesale had a perfected security interest in
the proceeds from its collateral. Therefore, "no later creditor
could obtain priority over Wholesale from the time its financing
statement was filed and further perfected pursuant to Section
9-306(3) .

.

. Wholesale's security interest in those proceeds re-

lates back to its initial financing statement. '8 7 The court, however, rejected any notion that Wholesale's right to nonproceeds
pursuant to section 9-306(4)(d) also related back to the initial
financing statement. Unlike the floating lien in DuBay that gave
the creditor a security interest in all of the debtor's accounts
receivable, the financing statement in Gibson Products gave
Wholesale a perfected security interest only in the proceeds from
its collateral. The court noted that "Wholesale had no interest in
cash other than its own proceeds, and hence no priority over
later creditors in such cash, until (1) some part of Wholesale's
proceeds were deposited with other cash in Gibson's bank account, (2) within ten days of Gibson's filing its Chapter XI
petition.18 8 The court thus concluded that "[t]he transfer cannot

occur earlier than ten days before the institution of bankruptcy." 89 As a result, the court held "that Wholesale cannot
85

See Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 490 F.2d 1304, 1309-10 (9th Cir. 1973).

86 543 F.2d at 656. Judge Hufstedler quoted the statement about "act" versus

"evenC; text accompanying note 76 supra.
", 543 F.2d at 656.
11 Id. at 656-57 (emphasis supplied).
'9 Id. at 657. Professor Countryman goes even further, asserting that a subsequent
lienholder could obtain a superior position to a § 9-306(4)(d) creditor until the moment
of the institution of insolvency proceedings.
Save to the extent that the proceeds-secured creditor has, prior to bankruptcy,
a perfected security interest in identifiable but commingled cash and identifiable but banked cash and checks, a creditor who at any time before bankruptcy
levied on the debtor's cash or garnished his bank account would prevail over
the proceeds-secured creditor.
Countryman, supra note 8, at 275.
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successfully assert its claim under U.C.C. section 9-306(4)(d) to
thwart the trustee's power to set that interest aside as a
preference." ' 9 '
C. Ramifications
DuBay stressed that it was not necessary to look to the particular event that attaches a secured interest to a specific
property. 9 1 The rights of the creditor in DuBay to all the accounts receivable that came into existence after the filing of the
financing statement arose by virtue of the agreement itself.
Judge Hufstedler's observation in Gibson Products that Wholesale
had no interest in nonproceeds until commingling had occurred
within ten days prior to bankruptcy may at first glance appear to
retreat from the DuBay test because the transfer in Gibson
Products was held to occur at the point at which an interest in the
nonproceeds attached under section 9-306(4)(d). Closer scrutiny, however, reveals otherwise; in Gibson Products, the court
never reached the issue of Wholesale's priority over other creditors, having determined that Wholesale's right to the nonproceeds came into existence only by virtue of the U.C.C. This
right in turn was held to be a voidable preference under the
bankruptcy Act because it only arose within the ten days prior to
bankruptcy. In DuBay, by comparison, the financing statement
conferred a general interest upon the creditor that was "so far
perfected" that a transfer was deemed to occur at the time the
financing statement was filed. 9 2 Because the transfer occurred at
the time of the filing, the creditor's secured interests in the
specific accounts receivable as these accounts came into existence
were perfected because the secured interests related back to the
time of the filing. In Gibson Products, however, the court never
reached the issue of whether a subsequent judgment creditor
would have priority over Wholesale because it found that
Wholesale's interest under the U.C.C. was a voidable preference;
in addition, Wholesale had no interest in nonproceeds under the
financing statement itself, in contrast to the DuBay creditor's
floating lien. The rights of Wholesale to the nonproceeds arose
solely by the operation of section 9-306(4)(d); the attachment of
that security interest was relevant only because "[i]n this situation, the act that gives Wholesale priority and the events that
91543 F.2d at 657.
91 See text accompanying note 76 supra.
92 417 F.2d at 1287-88; see text accompanying note 75 supra.
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attach the security interest to the questioned asset occur at the
same time."93
These rights, however, were granted in lieu of Wholesale's
right to its proceeds under the financing statement and depended upon the amount of his proceeds received by the debtor
during the ten days prior to bankruptcy. Thus, although DuBay
did not mandate the conclusion that the rights granted by section 9-306(4)(d) relate back to the financing statement, the
rationale of DuBay could easily have been extended in Gibson
Products to achieve that result. The Ninth Circuit might properly
have interpreted "any cash proceeds" to mean those funds attributable to Wholesale's collateral, and might have chosen to
extend the DuBay rationale of not looking to the specific event
that attaches a security interest to a specific property but rather
to the act ultimately giving rise to those interests to hold that the
rights conferred by section 9-306(4)(d) related back to the initial
agreement. The result of this approach would have been logical
and equitable: the secured creditor would have had a nonvoidable preference in those funds properly attributable to the sale
of his collateral.
The Ninth Circuit's reluctance to extend the DuBay rationale
to cover the situation in Gibson Products results from its own
misreading of the U.C.C. First, the court's misinterpretation of
section 9-306(4)(d) made the creditor's rights to nonproceeds
under this provision appear completely unrelated to his rights
derived from the financing statement. Furthermore, this misinterpretation seemed to give the creditor an unfair advantage
because he would have realized a huge windfall had he prevailed
on the "transfer" issue.94 The court would therefore not be predisposed to decide the "transfer" issue in the creditor's favor
unless it had no alternative. 95 The consequence of this approach
93 543 F.2d at 657.

"4 See id. at 654; text accompanying note 65 supra.
9- The court's reluctance to extend the DuBay test might also have stemmed from
the doubt cast upon the continued vitality of the test by the recent proposed amendment to the Bankruptcy Act. Proposed § 4-607(g)(6) would have changed the definition
of transfer to read: "A transfer . . . of property other than real property is perfected
when the transferee has acquired an interest in the property which is superior to the
rights a subsequent judicial lien creditor could acquire in the property transferred."
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAwS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 168, Part II (1973) (emphasis supplied). Proposed
§ 4 -607(g)(7) states that "[a] transfer does not take effect before the transferor has
acquired rights in the property." Id. (emphasis supplied). The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws made clear that the purpose behind these changes was to require an
actual interest in the property before a transfer could be deemed to have occurred; id.
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was to deny Wholesale, a creditor that was not insistent and had
not attempted to convince the debtor to make a transfer that
would have favored it to the detriment of other creditors, 96 any
recovery of its collateral-an equally inequitable result as a windfall gain.
The court in Gibson Products might have formulated an approach that would have entitled the creditor to the proceeds
from the sale of his collateral, rather than allowing him to receive either a windfall under the U.C.C. or no preference whatsoever under the Bankruptcy Act.9 7 The court might have
reached an equitable result by: (1) properly defining the right in
section 9-306(4)(d) of "any cash proceeds" as those proceeds
stemming from the sale of the particular creditor's collateral
within the ten days prior to bankruptcy; (2) recognizing that the
right to such proceeds was intended to replace and to approximate the more awkward right to trace; (3) stating that this right,
like the superseded right to trace, dated back to the filing of the
initial agreement; (4) ascertaining that the initial agreement between Gibson Products and Wholesale anteceded the bankruptcy
proceedings by more than four months; and (5) thus concluding
that the right was not a voidable preference. As a result,
Wholesale would have been able to claim those proceeds derived
from the sale of its collateral in the ten days prior to bankruptcy,
thereby fulfilling an objective of both the U.C.C. and the Bankruptcy Act.
III. CONCLUSION
In Gibson Products, the Ninth Circuit adopted two dubious
interpretations of section 9-306(4)(d) of the U.C.C. By defining
"any cash proceeds" in section 9-306(4)(d)(ii) very broadly and by
retaining a right to trace proceeds under section 9-306(4)(d), the
court misconstrued the provision to prevent the implementation
of the draftsmen's intent. Furthermore, the court cast the creditor in an unfavorable light when it came to resolving the con174-75. The Commission also stated that "[t]he last sentence [of § 4-607(g)(7)], along

with paragraph (6) of subdivision (g) overrules DuBay and kindred cases." Id. 175. Although these proposals have not been implemented, the explicit rejection ofDuBay might
help explain the court's refusal to extend DuBay to cover § 9-306(4)(d). Yet the Commission's refusal to reject DuBa, attests to its continued vitality.

' 6 See text accompanying note 80 supra.
9 This Comment merely suggests that Gibson Products might have taken a different
approach and does not attempt to resolve the conflict between the U.C.C. and the
Bankruptcy Act. See note 9 supra.
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flicting rights arising under the U.C.C. and the Bankruptcy Act.
In defining "transfer" in section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, the
court remedied the inequity it had created; but an alternative
approach would have been more logical and more capable of
producing an equitable result.

